this discretion is the prosecutor's power to choose not to initiate a prosecution, even in those cases in which sufficient evidence to support a conviction exists. 1 2 A variety of reasons are given as justification for this enormous grant of power to the prosecutor. Among these are the 74 (1954-55) . The American Bar Association (ABA) has prepared Standards for prosecutors to follow, including Standard 3-3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision, which will be referred to repeatedly in the dialogue which follows this introduction. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-NAL JUSTICE 3-1.1-6.2 (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS).
For discussions of legal challenges or legislative responses to the infrequent prosecution of cases of spousal assault in the context of the discretion to charge, see A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8, at 281-88; Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1657 REV. , 1699 REV. -1702 REV. (1981 ; Blum, Memorandum on Prosecutorial Discretion (1981)(unpublished memorandum available through National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., New York); see also sufira note 7 and citations therein.
12 "The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction. . . ." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9(b) . As one commentator notes, "The authority. . . to refuse to prosecute a complaint or indictment. . . is profound." Lezak, The Prosecutor's Discretion-the Decision to Charge, in THE PROSECUTOR 'S DESKBOOK 23 (1971) .
13 See LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533-34 (1970) ("No prosecutor has available sufficient resources to prosecute all of the offenses which come to his attention"); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56 ("Realistically, there are not enough enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute every criminal act that occurs").
14 The problem of outdated laws is part of the larger problem of overcriminalization. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56 (referring to "breadth of criminal legislation"). LaFave, supra note 13, at 533; Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Leglislative Process, CURRENT PROB. CRIM. L. 481, 485-86 (1960) (noting confusion created by failure to revise criminal codes and weed out "inconsistencies, overlapping provisions, archaic language, and obsolete provisions").
15 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56 ("The public interest is best served and evenhanded justice best dispensed not by the mechanical application of the 'letter of the law,' but by a flexible and individualized application of its norms thrdugh the exercise of a prosecutor's thoughtful discretion."); LaFave, supra note 13, at 534.
[Vol. 75 cutor's decision not to charge an individual or not to prosecute an entire class of offenses may be based on criteria as unspecific as "the public interest"' 6 or "the interests of the criminal justice system."' 7
The operation of discretion requires a society to trust the prosecutor's good faith and ability to assess correctly the nature of the public interest. This assessment is no easy task, however, in relation to spousal assault. Our culture has a history of not only tolerating, but approving, the striking of a wife by a husband. 18 In addition, there is a long-standing tradition of not intervening, particularly with the criminal process, in what are often referred to as "family squabbles. ' 19 The pressure to change this pattern of infrequent or non-prosecution is very recent, 20 and, in the absence of severe physical injury, many questio ns remain about how the criminal justice system should treat these cases. Although many decisions not to charge may be due to overt sexism, 2 1 many more may be the result of our society's confusion about the proper role of the criminal justice system in relation to "minor violence" 22 in families or intimate relationships.
23
It .is not an answer, unfortunately, to say that it is the province of the legislature to decide when the criminal process should be invoked. Our system's acceptance of prosecutorial discretion means that a prosecutor must evaluate a legislative mandate in the light of specific facts and the prosecutor's own perceptions of the public interest. Yet the mo-16 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56. 18 For the history of a man's legal right to "chastise" his wife, see Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, 19 Id. at 145-46. 20 See, e.g., L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 2-8, for a description of the beginning of the movement calling attention to the problem of spousal assault and its neglect by the criminal justice system. 21 Some of the worst examples of sexist attitudes affecting prosecutorial decisionmaking can be found in Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 158-59. These and other examples will be explored in the dialogue which follows. Straus, supra note 1, at 554, gives the following statement as one of the nine ways in which sexist attitudes maintain patterns of violence against women: "9. Male Orientation of the Criminal justice System."
22 The phrase "minor violence" is taken from the Commentary to the ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 3-57 ("This discretion is commonly exercised in family conflicts where minor violence occurs").
23 Fleming states that
Many [prosecutors] are truly confused about whether prosecution benefits battered women, but their main concern is making law enforcement and prosecution appear to work in highly publicized criminal cases and those with unanimous condemnation. . . . The American criminal-justice system has no definitive answers . . . to the questions about what behavior is worthy of punishment. ... J. FLEMING, supra note 1, ment this discretion is permitted, many assumptions about these events come into play. The prosecutor, as a member of a society which has tolerated or ignored these events up until recently, is no less susceptible to a variety of assumptions, attitudes and misperceptions than any other citizen.
4
The dialogue which follows is an exploration of possible responses to a seemingly simple question: When should a family 'fight' which involved physical force or the threat of physical force be treated as a family 'crime'? It attempts to bridge the gap which now exists between those who favor prosecution of cases of "minor violence" in families or intimate relationships and those who do not, and the gap between the language of a number of criminal statutes and the enforcement of those statutes. We lack consensus concerning the criminality of domestic violence, and where there might be conviction we instead find ambivalence.
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TO CHARGE IN CASES OF SPOUSAL ASSAULT: A DIALOGUE
QUESTIONER: We should begin by stating our respective positions. I would have you initiate a prosecution in all cases of violence or threatened violence in which the offender and victim are spouses or intimates and in which there is probable cause 25 to believe that a criminal statute has been violated.
6
24 In discussing the kinds of offenses for which clear policies are needed "to maintain the desired measure of consistency" of prosecution, Norman Abrams refers to "crime arising out of intra-family squabbling." Abrams,supra note 11, at 11-12. He states, "The offenses on this list usually have an element of controversy about them. There is often lacking a popular consensus that enforcement should be one hundred percent or that the conduct should be treated as a serious crime or, indeed, as a crime at all." Id. (1980) . For purposes of this dialogue, a jurisdiction is envisioned in which the prosecutor receives reports of felony and misdemeanor arrests and then screens those cases before a formal charge is filed.
30 Victim complaints could be initiated in two ways: (1) by the victims themselves with no advice, or (2) by the victims on the suggestion of a police officer who felt that an arrest was not appropriate, but that prosecution might be. This discrepancy is the result of the law of arrest, which frequently precludes an arrest if an officer believes a misdemeanor did occur but did not witness the crime. For a discussion of changes in arrest powers in cases of spousal assault, see L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 119-33.
31 See supra note 6.
[Vol. 75 QUESTIONER: So it's the potentially serious physical injury which concerns you?
SPO USAL ASSAULT
37 In a study asking subjects to rank the seriousness of certain crimes, an injury which resulted in the victim's receiving medical attention was rated as a "4," while a minor injury "which does not require or receive professional medical attention" was given only a "1." See M. WOLFGANG, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 16-17 (1967 QUESTIONER: I think they are harmed, yes, 47 and that they learn. 48 And you can't see the injury which was never reported or the one which hasn't occurred. REv. 645, 649 (1980) . 46 Terror may be manifested by less observable physical symptoms such as "acute anxiety attacks resulting in heart palpitations, hyperventilation .. " L. WALKER, supra note 1 at 224; accordJ. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 88 ("Agitation and anxiety bordering on panic...").
47 There is now a substantial body of evidence indicating the harm done to children in homes with violent parents. For example, Walker states: "Impressive data, however, demonstrate that children who live in a battering relationship experience the most insidious form of child abuse. Whether or not they are physically abused by either parent is less important than the psychological scars they bear from watching their fathers beat their mother .. " See also L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 149-50 (Walker does not limit her definition of battering to severe physical assaults, but includes less severe assaults and psychological harms. Much of her book is devoted to an elucidation of the nature of "battering."); see also id. at 276 ("Older male children were aggressive, easily frustrated and engaged in disruptive behavior. . . . Female children were likely to become 'withdrawn, passive, clinging and anxious.' "); D. MAR-TIN, supra note 3, at 23 ("Children who 'merely' witness physical violence between their parents suffer emotional trauma.').
48 See R. GELLES, supra note 1, at 142 (indicating the learned behavior involved in spouse abuse); see also supra note 5. PROSECUTOR: You're not suggesting that I should prosecute someone for a crime they may some day commit?
QUESTIONER:
No, I'm not. I'm suggesting that you ought to consider prosecuting a person for the crime they did commit in spite of the fact that it does not meet your serious physical injury standard, and I'm offering up two utilitarian reasons for doing so. The harm may be more serious than you perceive, and you may be able to disrupt a pattern of behavior before more serious physical harm, including homicide, is done. A fact of particular concern to prosecutors is the finding, in another study, that there is a correlation between frequency of violence and the type of intervention sought by victims. This study found that "[w]omen hit weekly to daily are most likely to call the police, while women hit less often. . . are more inclined to get a divorce or legal separation." R. GELLES, supra note 1, at 100. Katz eds. 1978) . Parnas is a pioneer in the study of the criminal justice system's handling of cases of spousal assault. See generally Parnas, supra note 7. His recommendation is particularly telling in light of the fact that his early research was spurred by a belief in the need to "effectively [divert] cases from the criminal process." Id. at 755. He now advocates a "tradition response of arrest, prosecution and sanction . . . not only at the upper levels of violence, but also at the first minimal signs of trouble." Parnas, supra, at 191.
There is no consensus among those commentators who favor more prosecution of cases involving severe injury concerning the prosecution of "minor violence" cases. For example, Fleming recommends that
[a]dvocates should take care to concentrate their efforts on the most serious cases of abuse, which, if unprosecuted, are most likely to result in even more serious harm to the battered woman. Insisting on prosecution of every single case is unrealistic and not in the best interest of many victims. J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 200. Although this writer would agree that it is important not to neglect the most serious cases, it does not necessarily follow that it is essential to concentrate on those cases at the (possible) expense of the less serious ones. In fact, insofar as the importance-of-concentrating-on-more-serious-cases position is based on an expectation of the increased severity of future assaults, it would seem more desirable to intervene sooner rather than later in a possible pattern of abuse. It is important to recognize, furthermore, that an insistence on the importance of prosecuting cases of minor injury is not the same as an insistence on prosecuting every single case. Prosecutors who wish to attempt new ways of dealing But it's not only practical considerations that divide us. I suspect we have many different attitudes toward these events, and I want to learn more about how you decide whether to charge. with these cases may have, depending on the number of cases which come to their attention, difficult choices to make concerning resources and priorities. That reality is not, however, a reason for diminishing the significance of early intervention.
Fleming's concern about victims introduces the complex issue of the relationship between the decision to prosecute and the needs and/or desires of victims. Various aspects of this issue are touched upon throughout this dialogue.
51 A prosecutor's "sense of the victim" has many variations in the classic rationales for infrequent or non-prosecution of these cases. See, e.g., Micklow & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 158 ("The focus in each instance is whether the victimized wife is perceived as a 'worthy' victim deserving of both the prosecutor's and courts' efforts.").
On the other hand, the difficulties of victim testimony are real. Prosecutors must work to devise means of preparing victim-witnesses in order that they have less chance of presenting a victim who "takes the stand and is so frightened that she becomes unable to speak or to give coherent testimony." L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 23. A variety of solutions to this problem are available. See id. at 44-55. 52 One of the first obstacles that victims encounter in the criminal justice system is that law enforcement officials "do not believe the victim." Woods, supra note 7, at 10. 53 See supra note 39. 54 See supra note 25. The sentence requiring "sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction" is "new" according to the History of Standard, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 3-54. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, however, does not consider it a new criterion: "An accused should be screened out of the criminal justice system if there is not a reasonable likelihood that the evidence admissible against him would be sufficient to obtain a conviction and sustain it on appeal." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 17, STANDARD 1. 1 CRITERIA FOR SCREENING.
This dialogue takes place in a jurisdiction in which the likelihood of conviction is a basic criterion for charging. Recent research indicates that different prosecutorial styles place varying emphasis on the likelihood of conviction as an initial screening devise. Mellon, Jacoby and Brewer identify four "basic policy types or models: Legal Sufficiency, System Efficiency, Trial Sufficiency, and Defendant Rehabilitation." Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, The Prosecutor SPOUSAL ASSAULT QUESTIONER: Is that the reason you feel you must think about the effect of the victim on someone other than yourself?
PROSECUTOR: That's right.
QUESTIONER: But doesn't conviction depend in part on your ability to convince a judge or jury that a crime has been committed? PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: And isn't your ability to persuade likely to be affected by your own perception of the victim? PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: So we can't really begin to determine either the likelihood of conviction or whether you think that you should charge, given probable cause, without knowing more about how you perceive the victim.
PROSECUTOR: That's true.
QUESTIONER: Or the victim's injuries.
PROSECUTOR: You're implying that I'm concerned with the seriousness of the injuries because of my evaluation of the effect on others? 55 QUESTIONER: Which is based, in turn, on its effect on you. Yes, I was wondering if that wasn't part of your concern.
PROSECUTOR: I'm not sure what I think about that. I will tell you, however, that these cases are notoriously difficult to prosecute, and that fact affects my charging decision. QUESTIONER: I see we'll have to talk about this business of likelihood of conviction at some point, but I have one more question about serious injuries. You gave me an example of a case in which you might charge where there were no injuries but you also said you probably 57 For a summary of the studies indicating a greater likelihood of prosecution of "stranger" assault cases than "prior relationship" cases ("prior relationship" frequently is a euphemism for family or intimate relationship), see L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 24-29. Numerous other examples of policies of less prosecution in relationship than in stranger assaults can be found in Parnas, supra note 7.
A Bronx Case Evaluation Form, designed to measure "the seriousness of the case for prosecution" is a striking example of this differentation. This form quantifies various factors for purposes of screening. Scores are all positive, ranging from 1.3 ("intimidation") to 18.7 ("defendant with more than one felony conviction"), with the exception of the score for "victim and defendant-same family" which is assigned a negative value of 2.8! Bronx Case Evaluation Form, reproduced in J. JACOBY, PRE-TRIAL SCREENING IN PERSPECTIVE 38-39 (1976) .
A recent study of the handling of these cases by the Manhattan District Attorney's office indicates that, in cases charged, the existence of a prior relationship means there is a greater likelihood of charge reduction (from felony to misdemeanor assault) than in stranger assault cases. See Piior Links to Victim Cited in Reducing of Felonies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at B6, col. 3. 58 For an excellent discussion on the "societal interest in marital privacy" and its peculiarly chameleon character, see A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8, at 60-69. This privacy interest is not limited to marriage, although that institution defines the concept's legal boundaries. 59 The notion of making things worse, as will be demonstrated, extends to concerns about the relationship per se, the defendant and the victim. PROSECUTOR: I would say that in general our society would prefer to try to help keep the relationship intact than to prosecute a minor offense.
65
QUESTIONER: So you weigh all the different interests and you come up with an unnamed "in general" rather than the interests of the victim or of anyone else who might desire a prosecution? PROSECUTOR: You make it sound as if I'm disregarding the victim.
QUESTIONER:
You make it sound as if you're disregarding the victim.
PROSECUTOR: You're oversimplifying again. All I'm saying is that if I have two choices, and one may preserve or help preserve the relationship and the other may harm or help destroy the relationship, I think that most people would be more likely to opt for the former.
We're going in circles. I wonder if I'm misunder- 64 Abrams suggests that " [v] arious factors might influence a prosecutor to adopt a practice of nonprosecution. Opposition by the community might be such a ground. Immediately, of course, the question must be raised, 'which community?'" Abrams, supra note 11, at 15 (footnote omitted).
65 The Chief Prosecutor of Washtenaw County, Michigan, exhibited an extreme version of this attitude in an interview with Eisenberg & Micklow: "Does the time-honored concept, the sanctity of marriage, override society's interest in the enforcement of the criminal law? I think that the sanctity of marriage is more sacred than the criminal law and the one-punch fight . . . It overrides the criminal code." Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 158. A more subtle version of the same rationale is found in one of the reasons for Family Court (rather than Criminal Court) jurisdiction over assaults (including felonious assaults) involving family members: "[I]t is true that the primary purpose of family offense jurisdiction is to help the family rather than the individual." In The Matter of Montalvo v. Montalvo, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605, 611, 55 Misc. 2d 699, 704 (1968 QUESTIONER: But if your concern is the relationship I see no problem if the victim drops out.
PROSECUTOR: It isn't my job to initiate prosecutions that come to nothing.
So the concern isn't only a need to avoid making a choice which you think may harm the relationship. 68 It's also concern about the potential conflict between that need and your need as prosecutor to complete a prosecution successfully. Is that right?
PROSECUTOR: There's a conflict there, yes.
QUESTIONER: I feel haunted by your need for convictions.
PROSECUTOR: That's not my only reason for shying away from these cases. I'm not sure that we should treat minor assaults, let alone menacing words or threats, 69 in relationships as crimes. 66 This point has been made in slightly different ways by both D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 116, and A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8, at 69 ("But, where the partners conflict, the state is incapable of protecting that relation; in choosing whether or not to act, the state inevitably aligns itself with one partner or the other.").
67 Se infra text accompanying notes 115-26. 68 Walker's research indicates that concert over maintaining relationships in which violence has occurred is misguided: "The best hope for such couples is to terminate the relationship. There is a better chance that with another partner they can reorder the power structure and as equals can live in a nonviolent relationship." L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 29.
69 "Menacing" may be an element of simple assault, see supra MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(c), or it may be a separate offense. For example, the Seattle City Code defines "menacing" as follows:
(1)(a) by physical action he intentionally causes or attempts to cause another person reasonably to fear imminent serious bodily injury or death; or (b) by a present threat to another person subsequent to a history of threats or violence between himself and such other person, he intentionally causes or attempts to cause such other person reasonably to fear serious bodily injury or death. SEATTLE, WASH., Crrv CODE § 12A. 04.050(1973) . The significance of threats in relation to possible injury should not be underestimated. A study of domestic violence in Kansas City "revealed that violence was preceded by threats in 50 to 80 percent of the cases, and the 72 There is general agreement that victims seek intervention because they are, "at the very least, frightened." D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 13.
73 "Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may consider [are] . . . possible improper motives of a complainant." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9(b) (iv). The notion of motive is therefore formally introduced into the prosecutor's deliberations. Impropriety, the justification for this consideration of victim motivation, as opposed to motive per s, is discussed infra note 86, and accompanying text. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 17, Standard 1.17 ("Any improper motives of the complainant").
74 It is commonly believed that a victim's fear (motive in the sense of emotion, drive) means that she contacted the police for protection (motive in the sense of goal or purpose). See, e.g., Hamlin, The Nature and Extent of Spouse Assault in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECU-TOR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES 8 (1980) ("A call to the police is often a call only to have an outside authority figure stop the beatings"). Another assumption that is made about these cases is that the victim wants authorities to somehow repair a disintegrating relationship. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 72 ("In cases of domestic violence... [Vol. 75 
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SPOUSAL ASSAULT QUESTIONER: And you then decide that because prosecution won't serve that assumed purpose, which is itself an assumption, that you shouldn't charge. Correct? PROSECUTOR: You can't ignore the fact that prosecution may make things worse for the victim. PROSECUTOR: But the danger isn't as immediate. I can't feel right about going ahead if I think it may set off another assault.
QUESTIONER:
The danger may be more immediate if you do nothing. 77 But either way, the problem of danger to the victim points to a need to help ensure her safety, not a need not to charge. Don't you have options? Aren't there shelters in your community? Can't you assist her in getting a protective order? 78 PROSECUTOR: I can try, but there's a lack of shelters. QUESTIONER: I hope you've brought that fact to the attention of the public. 79 Assuming that the victim has somewhere to go or can be the criminal complaint is often a call for official help in deteriorating relationships, not for criminal prosecution").
Whatever the validity of either vision of the victim's reasons for calling the police, it is important not to allow such assumptions to obscure the need to ask what Raymond Parnas calls the "basic question," to wit, "what response, if any, should the legal system make after the dispute has been halted by police intervention?" Parnas, supra note 50, at 190.
75 It is essential that prosecutors work to differentiate those concerns for the victim which are paternalistic (and may, therefore, mask underlying biases) and those which are based on actual needs that the victim may have. One of these needs-the need for safety-is touched on at this point. For a discussion of other victim needs, see infra note 117.
For an example of prosecutorial paternalism, see Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 158.
76 It is an irony that the requirement that victim-witnesses disclose their addresses to prosecutors, who may then give these addresses to the charged assailant's attorneys (who may, in turn, give them to assailants) is one factor that increases the danger to a victim who chooses to prosecute. See D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 113.
77 Insofar as there is a connection between police refusal to arrest (or to impress upon the mind of an assailant that assault is a crime) and prosecutorial reluctance to charge, the prosecutor may have to share in the blame for renewed violence immediately following the departure of the police from the home. The threat of post-conviction danger has also been given as reason for nonprosecution of spousal assault cases. But you must begin with either a concern about enforcing a given law or the need to weigh all factors.
PROSECUTOR: It comes out the same either way.
QUESTIONER: The way it comes out may be a function of the emphasis you place on either task. If you begin by considering the victim's feelings, and here you assume they are against prosecution or at least not for prosecution, then you may go no further in your deliberations. If you start by deciding that it's important to enforce the laws against assault, your view of the victim's role may take on a different significance. 80 See the ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, Standard 3-1.1 at 3-6, describe the function of the prosecutor: "(b) The prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and an advocate. The prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions." The administrator function is described in the Commentary: "[T]he prosecutor acts as a decision maker on a broad policy level and . . . also has responsibility for deciding whether to bring charges .. " Id. at 3-7.
[Vol. 75
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SPOUSAL ASSAULT PROSECUTOR: That may be. One way or the other, though, I'll still have to evaluate all the factors.
QUESTIONER:
Go ahead, then, and evaluate.
PROSECUTOR: What I started to say before is that I don't feel comfortable with the idea of taking over and prosecuting if the victim's request for help was meant to be no more than a call for protection.
Let me ask you something. Is it true that in all cases in which a victim's purpose in calling the police or coming in to report a crime is to obtain protection, rather than to see someone prosecuted, that you'd decide not to prosecute?
PROSECUTOR: I don't assign the same weight in all cases to the victim's desires, no. 8 '
81
The prosecutor shifts the discussion at this point from a consideration of the possible discrepancy between the prosecutor's task and the victim's reasons for calling the police to a consideration of the weight to be assigned to the victim's desires with regard to whether to prosecute. This shift is possible because of the (commonly made) assumption that the victim does not want to prosecute. See supra note 74. There is disagreement among those persons who have worked extensively with spouse abuse cases, and who favor prosecution of those cases, concerning the issue of the role of the victim's wishes in the decision whether to charge. See L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 42-43. This study of experimental programs describes three programs (Santa Barbara, Philadelphia, and Westchester County, New York) in which charges are filed "only if evidence is sufficient and the victim wishes to participate." Id. at 42 (emphasis in original). The Los Angeles City Attorney's Office does not ask the victim's wishes, but makes the decision whether to charge on the basis of the prosecutor's own evaluation of the case. Seattle, Washington, prosecutors file charges automatically when an arrest has been made, but only if the victim elects a prosecution when there has been no arrest. Id. at 42-43.
Differences between these policies, however, may be more apparent than real. There are different situations in each office which call for or require different treatment of victims; these differing situations may be more determinative of the victim-wish policy than any special political or psychological vision of the victims of spousal assaults. For example, in New York there is a legal requirement that victims be advised "of their 'right of election,' that is their right to choose which court their case will be heard in." J. Pirro, Criminal Law News (Westchester County District Attorney Office, Sept. 1980). In Seattle, a superb police call referral system enables the prosecutor to contact victims by letter in cases in which the police have not made arrests, urging them to assist in a prosecution. To ask the victim to come forward and discuss the possibility of prosecution creates a very different situation with regard to the victim's desires than one in which a victim has come forward of her own initiative. A copy of the victim contact letter used by Seattle City Attorneys may be found in L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 37. Finally, in Philadelphia, the issue of victim choice may be more theoretical than actual. Prosecutor Bebe Kivitz reports that almost all the victims she sees want prosecutions to proceed at the outset. Interview with Attorney Bebe Kivitz of the Domestic Abuse Unit of the District Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Nov. 30, 1981) .
Attorney Kivitz' observation concerning victim desires at the outset introduces the second element of the issue of victim choice in the prosecution of spousal assault cases: the handling of the "reluctant victim." What is important to note at this point is that victim reluctance does not necessarily occur at the time that a filing decision must be made. Instead, it is a phenomenon which is anticipated, and it is that anticipation which plays a role in the QUESTIONER: I didn't think so. If there were a robbery, for example... 
PROSECUTOR

QUESTIONER: I see we haven't dispensed with that idea.
PROSECUTOR: It's hard to let it go. 8 5 But there's another reason why I might decide not to prosecute because of the victim's motives. It stems from the fact of the relationship, though it isn't because of my concerns about harming a relationship.
QUESTIONER: What is that?
prosecutor's decision to charge. For further discussion of this problem, see infia notes 115-126, and accompanying text.
82 "When the crime charged is a nonserious felony or misdemeanor, it is common. . . to abide by the request of a reluctant victim." Hall, Role ofthe Victim, 28 VAND. L. REv. 931-951 (1975). 83 One commentator notes, "While the 'less serious crime' category is imprecise, prosecutors generally exclude from this category crimes in which real or threatened physical force is used." Id., at 931. 84 Hall found that "[iun domestic squabbles, however, even when force is used against one spouse, the complainant's request to dismiss the charge frequently is honored.
Id. (emphasis added).
85 A most dramatic, and tragic, example of our culture's reluctance to interfere, even when force is used, in the face of a relationship or an assumed relationship between a man and woman is the Kitty Genovese case. Fleming dedicated her book to Genovese and records the fact that "[a]lthough thirty-nine people heard her screams and cries, no one called the police. Most explained that they had thought the murderer was her husband." J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at xi. Studies indicating norms approving violence in relationships are discussed in Straus, supra note 1, at 550-51.
[Vol. 75 SPOUSAL ASSA UL T PROSECUTOR: Well, relationships have emotional histories as well as immediate emotional intensity. If I knew there were no serious physical injuries, and if I found the victim less than credible, I might become suspicious about motive in a way that I would not with an assault upon a stranger. 86 QUESTIONER: If the victim is less than credible, you may have a problem with probable cause, not with motive.
PROSECUTOR: I used the wrong word. I'm skeptical about her motives, but I do believe that she was hit. For example, if the victim and defendant had had an argument, a heated argument, and he hit her once, and she wasn't really hurt...
QUESTIONER: Really hurt?
PROSECUTOR: . . .physically injured, but she's still furious. She could be upset about something he'd said or done and not about being hit. She could come here, file a complaint against him, and hope that he gets prosecuted. PROSECUTOR: Because the victim is using the prosecution as a way of getting back at the defendant and I don't think it's appropriate to crank up the whole apparatus of the criminal law for that purpose.
QUESTIONER: Because?
PROSECUTOR: Because the system doesn't exist to right private wrongs or fight private fights. 88 QUESTIONER: I thought one of the theories underlying our system of public prosecution was a preference for funnelling private vengeance into socially acceptable forums. 89 Crimes against persons are considered 86 The discussion which follows deals with the "possible improper motives" referred to supra in note 73. QUESTIONER: That sounds as if you're deciding that the victim must suffer in a way and in an amount that you consider equivalent to the suffering of being prosecuted before you're willing to charge.
PROSECUTOR: It doesn't sound good, but there's some truth in that. It sounds less unpleasant if you think about the fact that you've stripped away some of the import of serious injury. I said earlier that I thought it was safe to assume that a more severe injury is indicative of a more serious act. PROSECUTOR: I think there may be a correlation in many cases between the severity of an injury and the desire to harm.
QUESTIONER: So you infer greater culpability from the fact of more severe injury and that inferred culpability justifies a prosecution?
QUESTIONER: Yet the severity may be nothing more than the defendant's bad luck. The victim may have moved at the moment she was hit and so he struck her at a different angle, for example.
94
92 LaFave, supra note 13, at 534-35, lists "the most common situations in which prosecutors typically decline to prosecute . . . (c) When the mere fact of prosecution would, in the prosecutor's judgment, cause undue harm to the offender." Accord ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, Standard 3-3.9(b)(iii) ("the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender" is a factor to consider in the charging decision). 97 The equally-to-blame vision of domestic violence is prevalent. See, e.g., F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 267 ("Often the complainant is as 'guilty' as the suspect in contributing to the dispute...").
98 In established patterns of violence in relationships, as opposed to the one violent outburst being hypothesized in the dialogue at this point, the assailant frequently feels "sorry .... and conveys his contriteness." L. WALKER, supra note I, at 65. 99 According to a study by Gelles, our culture does permit a degree of what is called "normal violence." See R. Gelles, cited in Straus, supra note 1, at 547. Straus remarks that " [t] hese same attitudes are also widely shared by officials of the criminal justice system." Id.
1984]
be prosecuting cases like that? QUESTIONER: Yet you speak of a situation in which prosecution is not justified rather than one in which a prosecution should occur but in which there are mitigating elements.
ao0 A study by Straus demonstrated that loss of control is itself governed by norms of the degree of loss of control which is permissible. Straus, supra note 1, at 547. It does not take more than ordinary observation to note that a man who hits his wife may "choose" not to hit others, for example employers, who have upset him to an equal degree. QUESTIONER: The same details that we've been discussing? PROSECUTOR: That's right. A victim comes in, reports being hit, and you find out that there's been an argument. She's upset about a lot of things, not just being hit, maybe not even about being hit, he's never hit her before, she admits having baited him, she has no visible physical injuries, and she says he's repentant... 102 This attitude is common. For example, Miller refers to the fact that in Detroit, where detectives work in the prosecutor's office and make charging decisions in these cases for the prosecutor, a decision not to file charges "normally is the result when a husband has assaulted his wife but the injury is not serious and it appears that there was 'good cause' for him to do so." F. MILLER, supra note 1I, at 269 n.22, quoted in L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 17. 103 Compare the common equation of provocation and justification used by prosecutors, see supra note 102, with the provision of the Tennessee Code which makes "assault and battery upon a spouse 'for any cause whatsoever' a misdemeanor." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-602, cited in A. BOYLAN PROSECUTOR: The victim couldn't answer that.
104 Victims of spousal assaults frequently blame themselves for provoking or otherwise causing the violence, a fact which may be attributable at least in part to the fact that we live in a culture in which "the belief that it is rational to blame the victim" is common. L. WALKER, Supra note 1, at 15.
105 One commentator found that "[t]he most frequent reasons given by battered women for beatings concern such things as the dinner not being cooked on time or the house being dirty." J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 78.
106 "Police and prosecutors frequently assume these attacks are 'one-punch' fights, but when the twenty victims of Eisenberg and Micklow's study were hit, it was invariably more than once. Usually they receive a beating that lasted anywhere from five to ten minutes to over an hour." D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 112.
107 One study reported that "[hiusbands inflicted injuries on their wives with their hands in nearly half the cases [of aggravated assault], followed in frequency by blunt instruments, sharp instruments, and firearms." L. BOWKER, WOMEN, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL JUS-TICE SYSTEM 125 (1978) (information from a 17-city study done by the National Comm'n on the Causes of Prevention of Violence).
108 See supra note 49. 109 Findings of a recent study of patterns of violence indicated that 32% of domestic assault defendants had been rearrested for other crimes mostly unrelated to the original victim. See A Study of Patterns in Family Violence, supra note 49.
QUESTIONER: The assailant might be able to. But let's say no history, one hit, vicious verbal provocation, no injuries. I might warn, then, rather than charging.
PROSECUTOR: Warn?
QUESTIONER: Yes, I might inform the assailant in no uncertain terms that battery is a crime, that I am letting it go this time, but will not the next time whether there's provocation or not. And I'd keep a record of the complaint.l1o
PROSECUTOR: So you're willing to make an exception to your argument favoring charging in every case with probable cause?
QUESTIONER: I might be willing.
PROSECUTOR: And what's your "might" about?
QUESTIONER: It's a recognition of the fact that real life always has more detail than hypotheticals. And it's also a concession that there may be some cases this extreme which would force me to fall back on PROSECUTOR: But before you mentioned terrible fear. Now you're worried about ordinary fear?
110 The Westchester District Attorney's Office sends out approximately 200 warning letters each year. The letter states that no charges are being filed, but the complaint will be kept on file. A copy of the letter may be found in L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 67. The letters have been found not to precipitate violence. They also appear to have served some deterrent function: "subsequent violence appears to be rare." Id. at 64.
111 "The frailties of human language and human perception will always admit of borderline cases. . . ." Goldstein, supra note 9, at 586.
112 See supra note 30.
QUESTIONER: If a person is made afraid of another person, all it takes is a threat to harm in order to maintain that fear. 1 3 It's an injury that I consider serious, and so I might charge. QUESTIONER: Yes, I remember. Didn't we decide that your concern had to do with your need to win a conviction?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, but only in part. I'm still not satisfied by your assumption that I shouldn't pay more attention to the victim's feelings in deciding whether to charge.
QUESTIONER: I didn't say that, but why do you think you should pay more attention to the victim's desires?
PROSECUTOR: Well, I'm concerned because I think a prosecution may add to her stress and fear and for no purpose since she's apt to drop out anyway.
113 Walker found that "[t]here does not need to be a steady reign of terror for the family atmosphere to be emotionally charged. Rather, the stage needs to be set through prior incidents . . . the only variable is when it [the next assault] might occur." L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 148. The presence of fear is related to the fact that "violence is often used as a mechanism to control the behavior of family members." M. STRAUS 1 15 Victim reluctance is the most common reason for nonprosecution of cases of spousal assault. For example, L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 13, states: "From the prosecutor's perspective, the primary problem with prosecution of spouse abuse is that it is time wasted, since most victims request that charges be dropped before dispositions are reached."
A prosecutor who has not been personally exposed to the legendary "reluctant victim" will learn of her soon enough through official literature available to prosecutors. So, for example, in elucidating ABA Standard 3-3.9(b)(v) "reluctance of the victim to testify," the Commentary states that In serious cases . . . the interests of the community require that the prosecutor try to obtain the victim's co-operation. . . . In contrast, the prosecutor may justifiably decline to prosecute less serious offenses because of lack of witness co-operation. This discretion is commonly exercised in family conflicts where minor violence occurs. Often the injured party who calls the police is later reluctant about prosecution ... ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11 at 3-57. The California District Attorney's Association has adopted the same view: "If the prosecutor believes that the victim's testimony will not be forthcoming, an assault is ordinarily not subject to successful prosecution and should, therefore, not be filed ....... CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S Ass'N, UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING MANUAL 3044 (4th ed. 1978 Revisions) . The prosecutor is expected to consider interviewing the victim of an assault "[w]henever there is a pre-existing relationship between an accused and a victim." Id.
That this sort of commentary may both be based upon and contribute to stereotypic biases can be demonstrated by a careful reading of the following passage by Miller: "Officials commonly believe that [married female] victims of assaults . . . will not willingly prosecute their assailants. . . . When the victim is a [wife] and is unwilling to sign a complaint, the reluctance of the victim is usually accepted by police and prosecutors." F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 174-75. What is notable about this excerpt is that the words in brackets have been substituted in both cases for the word "Negro" which is found in the original text.
116 The existence or absence of assumptions about the victim is crucial in the successful or (Sept.-Oct. 1981 ). This law is the result not only of a history of discouragement by law enforcement officials in Family and Criminal Court, see Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977 ), rev'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978 ), afd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979 (litigation directed at the problem of official discouragement), but also of the fact that victims in New York have a choice between criminal and civil remedies. This choice and its detrimental effect on victims is analyzed in Note,Jurisdiction over Family Ofenses in New York: A Reconsideration of the Provisions for Choice of Forum, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 601 (1980) . 122 Goldstein points out the difference between not discouraging and actively encouraging on the part of the police in the handling of assault cases. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 576. Prosecutorial refusal to charge in these cases on the ground that "victim refuses to prosecute" was a stated reason for the police reticence in encouraging victims to sign complaints. Id. at 575 n. 67. PROSECUTOR: Look, you can go on until you're blue in the face about the way in which my thinking is distorted by an emphasis on the because communications difficulties tended to discourage or 'turn off' some witnesses... but also because the system, by casting a false shadow of noncooperation on many witnesses, led theprosecutor to misinterpret their true intentions. Lerman is in accord with this assessment:
The recent experience of family violence prosecutors reveals no correlation between any identifiable characteristics of the cases or the victims and the likelihood of cooperation. The probability of victim cooperation is in fact better predicted by the conduct of the prosecutor than by the conduct of either the victim or the defendant. L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 41 (emphasis added).
124 Victims do call up and say they wish to withdraw after charges have been filed. Sally Buckley of the Seattle District Attorney's Office reports that 50% of the victims contact her about wanting not to testify. Interview with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1981) .
125 Experimental programs have devised systems which do respond to victims' fears and questions. Buckley, for example, reports that victims frequently express fear of going to court or guilt about assisting in the prosecution. Her office sees one of its major tasks as providing victims with information about the court and the prosecutorial system and with emotional support. Id.
Support systems are coupled with "no drop" policies: victims are informed that once charges are filed, the prosecutor will proceed with the case even if the victim develops a reluctance. A major advantage of this policy is that the victim cannot be coerced into not testifying or enticed into "repeatedly testing [her] resolve to go to court." L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 44-47. For an example of an abuse of a "no drop" policy, see infra note 127.
126 These programs have had impressive results in reducing victim-witness attrition in cases of spousal assault. For a summary of the percentage of cases in which victims cooperated, see L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 34-35. For example, in 1979 , the Santa Barbara cooperation rate was 92% of the cases in which charges were filed. Sally Buckley reports that her victim attrition rate is no different in spousal assault cases than in other crimes. Interview with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1981) .
127 A recent case in Alaska demonstrated an extreme which advocates of a "no drop" policy found inflexible and unfortunate. The victim-wife was jailed for a day because she decided not to testify. See Spouse-Abuse Victim Jailed After No-Drop Poliy Invoked, The National Law Journal, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4, col. 3 . One advocate called the tactic "outrageous." Id.
(quoting Lisa Lerman). need for conviction. But you aren't the one who has to deal with defense attorneys or walk into a courtroom and try these cases. QUESTIONER: No, I'm not. Nor do I have to bear the consequences of a decision to charge. But I'm not willing to let you fall back on that felt need to convict as long as I sense that that criterion provides a screening function which relieves you of the responsibilities of examining your own assumptions or devising more effective ways of dealing with this type of case.
PROSECUTOR: I have only so much time and money and I have more cases now than you can imagine. If I can charge in some kinds of cases knowing that I'll get convictions and that I'll be able to put people away, to protect the public, then why should I put out effort in other cases and come up with nothing? Particularly when coming up with nothing may convey the idea that people can get away with these assaults?
QUESTIONER: You're saying so many things at once... PROSECUTOR: They're all factors. I can't put one or more aside. Deterrence is viewed as working in two principal fashions. One involves the effect of imposing criminal sanctions on the subsequent behavior of the individual actually punished. This deterent effect .. . has come to be known as "special deterrence". . . . The second type of deterrence is concerned with the symbolic effect that punishment may have on potential criminals. The imposition of sanctions on one person may demonstrate to the rest of the public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby discourage criminal behavior in the general population. This deterrent effect has come to be known as 'general deterrence.' Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITA-TION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 95 (1978). going to be deterred from these assaults if there's never a conviction in these cases. QUESTIONER: Do you know for a fact that charging itself has no deterrent value or that charging without conviction is worse than nothing?
PROSECUTOR: Not for a fact, no. QUESTIONER: My common sense tells me something different. I don't find it farfetched to imagine that some people might be deterred by the idea of conviction, but others stopped cold by the prospect of being arrested and/or charged whether or not they imagine being Governor Carey, 1979) . This comprehensive discussion of philosophical and empirical aspects of deterrence is concerned with the phenomenon in relation to the formal sanction of sentencing rather than in relation to charging per se and any perceived punitive effect which charging might have. 130 One commentator notes that "[slometimes as little as a warning from a judge, an order of protection or an arrest causes men to cease their violent conduct." Woods, supra note 7, at 12. A recent study by the Police Foundation confirms "that the beet way for the police to prevent repeated acts of violence in the home may be simply to arrest men suspected of assaulting their wives or lovers.
. [o] nly 10 percent of those arrested generated a new official report . . . within six months" compared with 16% of those who received mediation instead of arrest and 22% of those who were simply ordered to leave their homes temporarily. QUESTIONER: You don't have to sell. You can consider educating the public about the nature of these offenses and the importance of initi-131 "It is well established that spouse abuse occurs in epidemic proportions in the United States, and that it pervades every race and ethnic group, every economic class, every area of the country." Center for Women Policy Studies, supra note 8, at I. One author found that "[people who work with spouse abuse cases] say that first offenders who have had no prior experience with the criminal justice system are deterred by the threat of prosecution. Fromson, supra note 33, at 3.
Sally Buckley of the Seattle District Attorney's Office reports that it is her subjective impression that a number of defendants are upset most of all by the "hassles with the law" rather than by conviction per se. Interview with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1981) .
132 Sentences are generally minimal: "If an assailant is found guilty, the usual penalty is probation and/or a fine. . . . If the assault is particularly severe or if it's his second or third conviction, he may spend some time in jail and receive a suspended sentence." J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 45.
133 The influence of public opinion on prosecutorial decisions is a complex issue which will not be discussed in this dialogue. For a brief discussion of this question, specifically in relation to election versus appointment of prosecutors, see the commentary to ABA Standard 3-2.3 and references cited therein, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 3-2 1. ating prosecutions in an effort to make the State's position unambiguous. QUESTIONER: You keep using phrases like "coming up with nothing but" or "never won." Your thinking about convictions obscures the possibility of changing your handling of these cases, which is one of the reasons, by the way, that I began by asking you to charge on the basis of probable cause.
PROSECUTOR: What are you suggesting?
QUESTIONER: That you stop equating infrequent conviction with no conviction and using that equation as justification for not attempting to learn more about solving the problems of proof.135 You might begin by substituting the word "seldom" for "never" and see that if over time you can't succeed in changing "seldom" to "sometimes ... "
PROSECUTOR: "Seldom" isn't going to take me a long ways with a defense attorney.
QUESTIONER: "Seldom" won't get you any leverage? 36 PROSECUTOR: Depends on the attorney and the attorney's experience. If he knows as much as I do about this type of victim . . . 134 One commentator, writing about the prosecutor's better bargaining position if he "consistently succeeds in court," noted that "the effect of this pressure to avoid [possibly unsuccessful litigaton] may be that the court calendar remains uncluttered. . . . But it seems unreasonable that the trial process should be reserved only for cases in which conviction is assured.
... Cox, supra note 11, at 414-15; see also id. at 414 (reference to the prosecutor's "status within the office [being] based upon conviction rate").
135 Cox noted that "[c]onversion of the prosecutor's desire to win into a resolution never to lose means that he avoids prosecution of doubtful or difficult cases." Id.
136 Leverage in plea bargaining is frequently acquired by prosecutorial bluffing, a phenomenon described in Ostrow, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581 , 1585 -87 (1981 . This tactic is often used when the prosecutor has insufficient evidence to prove an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, in cases other than spousal assaults, prosecutors are known to file charges in which "the evidence is not likely to support the burden of proof." Id. at 1585 n.15.
This writer does not advocate the practice of bluffing, but refers to it in order to demonstrate that if prosecutors are able and willing to proceed in other cases with "so little evidence," they should be prepared to negotiate with a defense attorney when there is more than a little evidence, but some worries about assumed victim withdrawal.
SPOUSAL ASSAULT
QUESTIONER: This type of victim? I think you must work to dispel your stereotype.
PROSECUTOR: It's not just a stereotype; there's the experience of many prosecutors.
QUESTIONER: Many prosecutors have not had the inclination or the opportunity to learn more. I'll tell you now that although I believe what I've been saying about the importance of chargingper se, I've been pulling your leg a bit. I wanted to hear your thinking about likelihood of conviction, so I waited until now to tell you that you may have a much greater likelihood of conviction if you adopt some of the programs that have been devised by those few prosecutors who have now worked extensively with these cases.' 3 7 I hope you'll forgive me. 139 This statement, beginning with the word "an" is taken verbatim from F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 267.
140 For a discussion of the difference between the importance of prosecuting this type of offense and an insistence that every single case be prosecuted, see supra note 50.
Prosecutors in the experimental programs feel that even with the increased caseload which may result from public recognition that the criminal justice system is now willing to prosecute these cases, there will be "fewer wasted resources." L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 44. you to make some. PROSECUTOR: I'm still bothered by something, though. I don't feel good about choosing to put effort into this type of case because I think there's a good chance that violence in relationships is inevitable so that 1 4 '...
QUESTIONER:
I agree that prosecution by itself is probably not going to wipe family violence out of the society, particularly when such violence is perceived as inevitable. But prosecution is your job and it's the contribution that you can make. Other people will have their contributions. 142 PROSECUTOR: But I think we could use up resources until the end of time and not even lessen this problem.
QUESTIONER: Do you know that for a fact?
PROSECUTOR: No, of course not.
QUESTIONER: Yet you have reason for believing it.
PROSECUTOR: I have a belief that the only lasting solution is for people to learn new ways of relating. In fact, I think that if victims would refuse to be assaulted, if they would simply get out of these relationships, then the problem would be solved. This optimistic evaluation is, of course, premised on a belief that some prosecution of these cases is worthwhile. A prosecutor who is opposed to taking on any of these cases would prefer no resources to less waste. 141 F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 267. 142 Other people have been contributing for some time, as the many references in these footnotes indicate. One of the more recent areas in which work has begun is concerned with working with violent (including "minor" violence) men in counseling and consciousness-raising groups. One such group in which men have taken the initiative to work with men is "Emerge" in Somerville, Massachusetts. The work that must be done may reach much further than the changes which focus on the problem of spousal assaults itself. For example, violence in media is a broader area that may play a role in the continued cultural patterns generating the enormous amount of family violence in our society.
143 This attitude is widely held: "[T]he prevailing attitude of many prosecutors and judges is that family violence is a private matter and should be worked out. . . without the intervention of the court." M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, supra note 49, at 233. Many also believe that "if only the victim would leave" there would be no need to prosecute, which is simply another version of family violence as a private problem. For many years, prosecutors would not file charges unless the woman indicated that she would leave-by getting a divorce. See Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 158. This "divorce test" reflects both the perception of victim as reluctant and the idea that private solutions are the only real solutions to these problems.
[Vol. 75 SPOUSAL ASSAULT QUESTIONER: Many, many reasons.
144 They may be economically dependent, they may have responsibility for young children and no place to take those children, they may know ofno place where they can retreat and the person who's harmed them will not pursue them, they may fear retaliation for an attempt to leave. And you assume that they never do try to leave, but we now know that some number do make that attempt and are then forced back, by hardship, into the homes in which they've been assaulted.
145
PROSECUTOR: I spoke hastily, and I apologize. Still, even granting that there are constraints, I think it's unlikely that anything will change until victims stand up for their right not to be hit.
QUESTIONER: Until they stand up and declare that it's behavior which they will not tolerate? PROSECUTOR: Exactly.
QUESTIONER:
When the society in which they live does tolerate that behavior and communicates that tolerance by refusing to condemn these assaults as criminal? PROSECUTOR: Do you really believe that if I began to charge more in these cases that the victims of such assaults would change? QUESTIONER: I do believe that, 146 but I don't think it's the business or the function of the criminal justice system to change victims. I think your task is a simpler one. You can use the resources, or some part of the resources at your command to make an unequivocal statement against the use of force or the threat of force in relationships. And if 144 Other reasons for victims not leaving, in addition to those listed in the dialogue, are guilt, emotional dependence, low self-esteem, traditional value systems, isolation, ambivalence, embarrassment and shame, fear of insanity, physical illness, learned helplessness-a theory attributed to the work of L. Walker. See L. Walker, supra note 1, at 31-35 and 42-54. These factors are each discussed in J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 81-95. A great deal of research has been done in this area. See, e.g., Gelles, Abused Wives, Why Do Thy Slay?, J. MAR- RIAGE & FAM. 659 (1976) .
145 According to Professor Maria Marcus of Fordham Law School, research done by Professor Murray Straus of the University of New Hampshire Sociology Department indicates that up to 90% of the women do make an attempt to leave home and end up returning because they cannot survive alone financially. Interview with Maria Marcus (Feb. 10, 1982) (discussing her participation in a New York City Bar Association panel discussion on spouse abuse, held Feb. 8, 1982) . In short, there is now reason to believe that although women must contend with the various factors listed in the dialogue and in note 144, supra, they are also able to overcome these factors in many cases, at least to the point of making an attempt to leave. More research is necessary in order to describe when and under what circumstances these women leave and return.
146 Attorney Sally Buckley reports that she has received accounts from victims that the fact of prosecution did enable them to gain confidence and assert their right not to be hit. Interview with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1981) .
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